Hiring new workers is costly and time consuming, yet many forms of investment have a …xed-cost component and can be pro…tably undertaken only by large producers. This paper studies how characteristics of the labor market impact income, trade and welfare via the time it takes for …rms to grow large enough to justify investing in exporting or in upgrading technology. In the theory, …rms make random contacts with potential employees slowly and labor market conditions determine the ease of hiring employed or unemployed workers. Firms choose an optimal time to invest in the light of their anticipated labor market experience. I use the model to examine the impact of labor market frictions on aggregate outcomes in general equilibrium. Lower frictions in job-to-job mobility strengthen …rms' incentives to invest, and the economy gains from labor market policies that encourage investment in the trading partner. The model predictions are consistent with observed correlations between …rm size, age and export activity, and also with observed correlations between export activity and the share of new hires attracted from other jobs and from other exporting …rms. I use an extended version of the model with ex-ante di¤erences in …rm productivity to match these moments in the data, to then simulate changes in the labor market and trading environments.
Introduction
Hiring new workers is a costly and time consuming activity. By many accounts, …rms face signi…cant costs of adjusting their labor force, both in developing and in developed countries. 1 Barriers to worker mobility in ‡uence the magnitude of these costs and delays. While labor market frictions may have diverse sources, many can be traced to institutional features of the labor market.
Recent cross-country evidence and studies of policy reforms favor the view that …rm-level job ‡ows and employment adjustments are lower in more regulated labor markets. 2 Further evidence is suggestive of an association between the labor market environment and …rms'employment growth.
According to the estimates in Jolivet et al. (2006) , job-to-job transitions are a more common occurrence in countries that feature more ‡exible labor markets. For example, an employed worker is …ve times more likely to contact a prospective employer in the United States than in Portugal, which, according to Botero et al. (2004) , are respectively among the least and most regulated labor markets in the world. 3 To the extent that mobility between jobs serves to channel workers towards …rms that desire to grow, labor market institutions that a¤ect the frequency of job-to-job transitions should impact the distribution of growth rates in the economy as well as the …rm size distribution.
At the same time, many forms of investment have a …xed-cost component, and can be pro…tably undertaken only by large producers. Participation in international trade is a paradigmatic example.
Obtaining the increase in revenues associated with access to foreign markets requires spending considerable amount of resources in setting up distribution networks or developing products, among other activities. Firms need to be large to cover these costs. Other decisions of …rms besides exporting respond to the presence of …xed costs, e.g. foreign direct investment (Helpman et al., 2004) , technology choice (Bustos, 2011) , access to imported inputs (Halpern et al., 2009 ), number of export destinations (Eaton et al., 2008b) , and number of products (Bernard et al., 2011) . In these cases, and in tune with empirical observations, the result is that larger …rms select themselves into activities that enhance productivity or revenues per worker.
This dependence of investment on …rm size, and of …rms' growth on labor market frictions, naturally forges a link between the labor market environment and aggregate outcomes. This paper studies how labor market frictions determine income, trade and welfare through their impact on 1 Recent papers …nd evidence of labor adjustment costs using di¤erent methodologies, e.g. Eslava 2 Kugler (2007) summarizes evidence based on reform episodes that a¤ected speci…c groups of …rms in Italy, Spain, Germany and the United States. As a general …nding, a tightening in employment protection regulation tends to reduce job ‡ows and net employment adjustments for the a¤ected …rms. Haltiwanger et al. (2008) …nd that hiring and …ring costs reduce job ‡ows in a …rm-level dataset that includes 16 countries. 3 Jolivet et al. (2006) report the share of employment spells ending with a job-to-job transition and estimate the probability of an on-the-job contact with a potential employer in 11 OECD countries. The correlations between each of these measures and the summary index of restrictiveness in employment laws reported in Botero et al. (2004) are -0.68 and -0.78, respectively. the …xed-cost investment decisions of …rms. I present a theory where …rms expand their workforce slowly and can pay a sunk cost to enter foreign markets or upgrade their technology, and where labor market conditions determine the ease of hiring employed or unemployed workers. As it is well known, …rms are usually born small and grow over time, and exporters are relatively old and large. The key aspect of the analysis is that this typical …rm life cycle is shaped by barriers to worker mobility. First, I use a baseline theory to examine the impact of labor market frictions on aggregate outcomes in general equilibrium. Then, I use an extended model together with summary statistics from linked employer-employee data for a quantitative assessment of the mechanism.
The theory builds upon a standard model of a labor market with search frictions where …rm size is determined by e¢ cient job-to-job transitions, in the tradition of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) . Ex-ante symmetric …rms match randomly with workers, who learn about job opportunities both when unemployed and on-the-job. Rent sharing takes the same form as in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) , where …rms make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers and current employers can counter-o¤er, resulting in Bertrand competition for workers between …rms. I make two main departures from this setup. First, I introduce simple …rm dynamics. Firms are born and die continuously due to exogenous shocks. Those who survive contact potential employees slowly, taking into account the transition towards their long-run size to compute the present discounted value of pro…ts. Second, …rms are allowed to make a once-and-for-all investment to obtain a permanent increase in revenue per worker. This investment may represent a technology upgrade or entry into a foreign market.
In the latter case, the revenue advantage of exporters derives from product di¤erentiation and monopolistic competition, as in Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) , and depends on the relative size of the two economies.
These elements generate a …rm life cycle. Firms are born small, accumulate workers slowly, and invest when they are su¢ ciently large. The timing of investment is the key outcome of the model; it constitutes a summary statistic for aggregate income and the volume of trade. I show, in Section 2, that it is determined by a simple trade-o¤. First, …rms have the natural incentives to delay the investment to save on the interest value of sunk costs, and to invest earlier to obtain greater revenues on their current workforce. Second, investing earlier generates a higher yield on …rms'search for workers along their growth path until the investment. This occurs because …rms may contact workers who are already employed by competitors that o¤er better jobs, being as such too costly to be attracted. Since the value of a job increases as the …rm approaches the time of investing, by investing earlier a …rm becomes a stronger competitor in the labor market and expands faster. Labor market fundamentals a¤ect aggregate outcomes through their impact on this trade-o¤.
Section 3 examines the role of labor market ‡exibility and unemployment compensation in a single country. Characterizing the general-equilibrium e¤ect of changes in the labor market requires keeping track of each …rm's response to the distribution of competitors, and of shifts in the size distribution and in the number of …rms. With more competitors, each …rm grows more slowly and delays its investment. Job-to-job transitions have a central role in shaping the aggregate allocation; in equilibrium, workers ‡ow from younger and smaller …rms who have not yet invested into older and larger …rms, and lower frictions in job-to-job transitions strengthen …rms'incentives to invest earlier in order to hire more often from other …rms. In contrast, frictions in transitions out of unemployment have no e¤ects on the timing of investment or in output per worker, because their impact is exactly absorbed by …rm entry or exit. Transitions between jobs are not only needed for frictions to have a general equilibrium impact; as it turns out, allowing for job-to-job mobility is also necessary for the size distribution of …rms to exhibit a realistic shape. Finally, I also …nd a distinctive role for unemployment compensation. Higher transfers to unemployed workers raise aggregate investment through a reduction in labor market competition, promoting faster …rm growth towards the size that justi…es the investment.
These results correspond to an economy where …xed-cost investments are key for productivity.
While many types of economic activities …t this type of investment, participation in international trade is one of the most natural cases. 4 To explicitly account for the role of frictions in an open economy and to connect with exports data, Section 4 extends the analysis to a two-country setup.
In this framework, as in Krugman (1980) , there are no exogenous di¤erences in productivity across …rms, but as in Melitz (2003) there is selection into exporting based on …rm size. In this context, the single-country results enumerated above have a natural correspondence with the volume and the income gains from trade. When countries are symmetric, policies that encourage more frequent transitions between jobs or larger unemployment bene…ts induce earlier entry into exporting, generating income and exports increases in both countries. When countries are asymmetric, labor market policies that favor export participation abroad induce an increase in the size of the foreign market, and this provides incentives for …rms to invest earlier in the home country. Thus, the theory uncovers a complementarity between labor market policies of trading economies. An economy gains when the trading partner implements labor market reforms that encourage investment.
A salient feature of the model is that it generates predictions consistent with a range of features of micro data. In the …rm life-cycle, it generates a positive correlation between …rm age, size and export activity. In the labor market, it gives rise to speci…c patterns of job-to-job mobility by export status: exporters are more likely than non-exporters to hire workers from other …rms instead of from unemployment, as well as from other exporters instead of from non-exporters. In Section 5 I verify that these patterns hold in the data. While the combination of alternative forces could account for some of these correlations, this paper provides a simple mechanism that qualitatively generates all of them. Furthermore, the prevalence of job-to-job ‡ows in the data is informative about the magnitude of the key friction in the model to determine aggregate outcomes. I exploit these relationships to calibrate the model. Section 6 presents the quantitative assessment. I use summary statistics from linked employeremployee data representative of formal employment in manufacturing in Argentina. For the parametrization I must extend the baseline setup in some dimensions that allow additional ‡exibility. 4 The …xed-cost nature of the exporting decision has been central in the international trade literature that springs from the the facts in Bernard and Jensen (1995) and from the Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003) models. See Das et al. (2007) for an estimation of export entry costs in the context of these theories.
Among other features, I include ex-ante heterogeneity across …rms. The baseline model yields dispersion in export participation by …rm size and age, albeit starkly: only …rms above a threshold are exporters. However, export participation increases slowly over age and size in the data. With ex-ante heterogeneity, lower-cost …rms choose to invest earlier, recruit more aggressively, and grow faster; as a cohort ages, there is a slow increase in export participation as …rms progressively select into exporting.
I parametrize the extended model to match moments in the data that correspond to the central outcomes in the theory: …rm age, …rm size, and share of new hires entering …rms from other jobs, by number of export destinations. First, I ask whether the model predicts a realistic …rm life-cycle.
I do so contrasting the patterns of export participation and growth over age that emerge from the calibrated model with their empirical counterparts. I …nd that the model fairly reproduces the joint pro…le of …rm age, size and export status for relatively younger …rms. However, it fails to match the growth rate of old exporters. Second, I use the model to measure welfare gains from changes in the labor market and international trade environments. I …nd lower welfare gains from trade in a more ‡exible labor market, suggesting a lack of complementarity between labor market and trade reforms. This contrasts with recent measurements of gains from trade and labor market reforms in di¤erent environments.
Connection with the Literature This paper characterizes in general equilibrium a model that combines …rm dynamics due to slow labor adjustment, …xed-cost investments and endogenous jobto-job mobility. Previous studies that allow for endogenous productivity di¤erences in variants of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) , such as Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) and Meghir et al. (2010) , restrict their analysis to the static decisions of …rms at their long-run scale. Here, the nature of the …xed-cost investment problem necessarily shifts the focus to the dynamic aspect in …rms'decisions.
The process determining the evolution of …rm size shares some features with Klette and Kortum (2004) ; as in that framework, …rms have linear revenue functions and expand by poaching workers (in their case, products) from other …rms. 5 Recent working papers, such as Garibaldi and Moen (2010) and Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010) , incorporate the idea of slow hiring as a source of …rm dynamics, but do not study …rms technology choice.
I study comparative statics for aggregate outcomes with respect to labor market frictions in general equilibrium. The impact of labor market characteristics on aggregate outcomes through …rms'investment decisions has been explored by Shimer (1999, 2000) in a directed search framework with single-worker …rms, where risk aversion and wage inequality drive technology dispersion. Lagos (2006) and Mortensen and Lentz (2010) also use models with a dependence of TFP on search frictions. More broadly, a growing literature studies TFP losses generated out of misallocation, as in Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) . None of these studies incorporates the slow growth of …rms coupled with the …xed-cost investment problem that is the focus here. This paper complements a growing literature that studies labor market frictions in an international trade context. The distinguishing aspect of my analysis is that frictions induce slow growth and a …rm life cycle, becoming a source of dispersion in size and export status across ex-ante identical …rms. Moreover, the sluggishness in the hiring technology underlying this dispersion crucially depends on job-to-job mobility. These features contrast with recent theoretical studies, such as labor market imperfections in a context of heterogeneous-productivity …rms. In these setups, the only force driving export participation is selection based on productivity dispersion, and job-to-job transitions are either ruled out or do not constitute an equilibrium outcome. 6 On the other hand, in a frictional labor market is a complementary force underlying …rm dynamics and selection into exporting. From an empirical standpoint, it is distinguished from these models by the speci…c predictions regarding the composition of new hires by export status, and by the impact of labor market characteristics on …rm dynamics and trade. I focus on these relationships in the quantitative section to measure frictions in job-to-job mobility, and to simulate counter-factual policy exercises.
Structure of the Paper The paper is structured as follows. The next section lays out the basic setup and characterizes the partial equilibrium problem of an individual …rm. Section 3 studies the general equilibrium in a single country, where the revenue advantage of exporters is taken as given.
At that stage, the model equivalently describes a closed economy where …rms make a choice between technologies with di¤erent productivity. Section 4 studies international trade with two countries, where the exporter revenue premium is endogenous. In section 5 I present the basic patterns in the data concerning …rm age, size, export status, and job-to-job mobility. Section 6 develops the extended version of the model and presents the quantitative exercises. Section 7 concludes. Proofs are gathered in the appendix. 6 Also related is work by Holzner and Larch (2011) , who embed search frictions with job-to-job mobility in Melitz (2003) to explain that …rms do not serve all possible export destinations.
The Model
I develop a stylized model of the labor market in which the accumulation of employees takes time. Firms decide whether and when to expand revenues by bearing the …xed costs of entry into an export market or a more productive technology. I use this model to assess how characteristics of the labor market impact aggregate outcomes.
Preferences and Technology
There is mass of identical workers of measure one. Workers have dynastic preferences with linear utility for consumption of the …nal good and they discount the future at rate :
I focus on a steady state in which aggregate variables are constant, so that the ‡ow value of aggregate utility equals consumption of the …nal good, c.
A mass of …rms of measure M produce output using a constant-returns-to-scale technology with labor as the only factor of production. At any moment of time a …rm employs a stock of workers of measure n that evolves according to its experience in the labor market, as I describe below. Firm productivity can take one of two values according to a …rm decision that I also describe below.
They can produce y D units of output per worker with a simple technology or y X = y D units of output per worker using a superior technology, where > 1. At …rst, I will speak of this as a literal choice of technology, but later I will link it to export status. A …rm in an open economy that sinks the …xed cost of entry into a foreign market can earn more revenue per worker than one that sells only at home. When I focus on the role of trade, the revenue premium of exporters, , will be determined endogenously.
As will become clear in the next section, the assumption of constant returns to scale is used to facilitate the introduction of job-to-job transitions. By making the marginal valuation of new workers independent of …rm size, the total value of a match in a given …rm will depend only on how long a …rm with productivity y D plans to wait until switching to y X , or if it has already done so.
This will imply a simple pattern of transitions between jobs, with workers moving from younger to older …rms.
Labor-Market Environment
Labor markets are subject to a standard search friction whereby workers learn of jobs when unemployed or employed according to a random process. The Poisson rate at which a worker makes contact with some …rm is u for unemployed workers and e for employed workers. In reduced form, these parameters capture institutional features of the labor market that a¤ect worker mobility. In addition to the transitions between jobs to be described below, jobs are terminated at an exogenous rate and …rms su¤er a shock that forces them to exit at rate . This means that every employee moves into the pool of unemployed workers at rate = + . 7 The steady-state rate of unemployment is u = = ( u + ). To save notation later, I de…ne the normalized contact rate on the job e = e = .
Value of Jobs
Production technologies are not constant throughout the life of …rms. In equilibrium, …rms with technology y X do not switch back into y D , but …rms with technology y D may intend to upgrade at some point in the future if they survive long enough. The decision of when to invest is examined in the next section, but, for the moment, it implies that the relevant dimension of heterogeneity across …rms, in terms of the value of the jobs that they can o¤er to prospective workers, is how far removed they are in time from switching into the better productivity -or if they have already done so. Let x indicate this "time until switch" for a given …rm. Across the economy there are (potentially) three classes of …rms: x = 0 denotes …rms that have already invested; x 2 (0; 1)
denotes …rms that will upgrade in x periods from now; and x = 1 denotes …rms that will never upgrade no matter how long they survive. 8 Let v (x) represent the total value of a job held by a …rm whose time until switch, if they do not su¤er an exit-inducing shock before then, is x. This value re ‡ects the joint surplus of a match shared by the …rm and the worker. When a new relationship is formed, the partners divide the surplus according to the game posited by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2003): …rms observe the current status of contacted workers, tender take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, and commit to the value promised to the worker. As a consequence, when an unemployed worker meets a …rm, the o¤er leaves the worker indi¤erent between the job and the value of unemployment, w u , and is accepted. The present discounted sum of future expected pro…ts generated in …rm x by a worker who enters the …rm from unemployment equals the total value of a job held by this …rm, net of the amount necessary to lure the worker, namely
In contrast, when an employed worker meets a new …rm, the current employer hears the job o¤er and makes a counter-o¤er. The outcome is similar to Bertrand competition: the …rm o¤ering the job of greater total value obtains the worker, o¤ering in exchange a value equal to what the worker could obtain in the alternative employment. Transitions in this model are e¢ cient, hence we can conjecture that workers ‡ow from …rms with higher x into …rms with lower x. Therefore, when a worker moves from a …rm x 0 to a …rm x that is closer (in expectation) to the switching date, the …rm in state x captures a present discounted value of pro…ts
7 Firm exit is necessary to induce an invariant distribution of ages. Exogenous separations serve to bound the size of surviving …rms. 8 Since …rms are homogeneous and will all choose the same outcome, the equilibrium will either feature …rms who never invest (x = 1) or …rms who invest at some point (0 x < 1), but not both. In the extension with heterogeneity of Section 6 these types can coexist.
Note that both J u (x) and J (x 0 ; x) denote present discounted sums of expected pro…ts captured by a …rm from one particular worker at the instant when the worker enters the …rm. After that moment, the worker might leave due to an exogenous shock or make contact with another …rm, triggering a renegotiation or a quit. These possible events are re ‡ected in the computation of J (x 0 ; x). 9 The assumptions of the bargaining game and equation (2) can be used to derive the following.
Lemma 1
The total value of a job held by a …rm whose time until switching is x is
In ‡ow-equivalent terms, the value of a job o¤ered by a …rm that is x periods away from switching consists of the sum of the average revenue generated by the worker throughout the expected duration of the match and the value of unemployment obtained by the worker when the match is dissolved, which occurs at rate . This job value increases as the …rm approaches the time of switching (i.e., it decreases with x), con…rming our conjecture that workers move from high-x to low-x …rms, but not vice-versa. 10 
Value of Firms, Stock E¤ect and Timing of Investment
As anticipated, …rms can choose between the alternative technologies y D and y X . Firms enter the marketplace with no workers and grow subject to their contacts in the labor market while facing the risk of death. At birth, they are endowed with productivity y D , but they can choose at any time to make a once-and-for-all investment to upgrade to productivity y X . This investment entails a sunk cost with ‡ow-equivalent value of f X units of the …nal good per period. This "switching into a better technology" will be the same as "starting to export" for a …rm in an open economy.
A …rm has perfect foresight about the evolution of its stock of employees, facing no uncertainty beyond the exit probability. 11 As a result, …rms choose an age h at which to introduce the highproductivity technology. This decision is made on the basis of the ‡ow of workers obtained in each period and the valuation attached to each. At any moment, a …rm makes contact with
workers, where s=s is the search e¤ort exerted by the …rm to …nd workers relative to average search activity in the economy, and M is the measure of …rms. Until Section 6, s is assumed to be common to all …rms. As a result, a worker who hears of an opening has the same probability of 9 See Appendix A.1 for explicit formulations. 1 0 In the data workers also move in the opposite direction; for example, there are transitions from exporters (x = 0 in the model) into non-exporters (x > 0). The model can be reconciled with these (relatively uncommon) ‡ows adding heterogeneity in …rm productivity or in …xed costs, as in the extension of Section 6. 1 1 I.e., I treat the stock of workers in the …rm as a continuous set, hence the individual contact and exit rates equal the fraction of workers who experience these shocks. Since growth is deterministic, it is equivalent to cast the …rm problem in terms of …xed costs fX per period.
being matched with any …rm, and di¤erences in the rate at which …rms accumulate workers arise solely from the ability to attract workers away from other …rms.
Because of our assumption of linear revenue functions, …rms wish to grow as large as possible; therefore, every match with an unemployed worker results in a hire. In contrast, out of all contacts made with employed workers, a …rm with time until switch of x only attracts those workers employed in …rms o¤ering jobs of lesser value, i.e. in …rms at x 0 > x periods from switching. Let G (x) be the share of employment in …rms whose time until switch is less than x; this distribution has mass points at 0 or at 1 that measure employment in …rms that have already implemented y X or that will never do so, respectively. Out of the contacted workers in (4), the fraction of new hires by a …rm with time until switch of x is then
The number of …rms M in (4) and the distribution of employment across …rms with di¤erent time until switch G (x) in (5) re ‡ect competition in the labor market and will be determined in general equilibrium.
The linear technology implies that the present discounted value of pro…ts generated by all workers who enter a …rm in state x, expressed in terms of the …nal good, is the sum of the values generated by each of these workers individually:
The …rst term in this sum is the present value of pro…ts generated by workers attracted from the pool of unemployment and the second term corresponds to pro…ts from workers attracted from other …rms, drawn from the employment distribution G. 12 A …rm whose time until switch is x attracts all workers who are contacted from …rms whose time until switch is greater than x. Using this expression, we can write the value at entry of a …rm that plans to switch into the high-productivity technology at age h as
A new …rm starts with no workers. When it has age a = h x < h, the switch lies h a periods ahead and incoming workers generate average expected pro…ts with a present discounted value of (h a); after h the …rm obtains (0) from new workers, which is the value of incoming workers in a high-productivity …rm for the rest of its expected life. To switch, it must pay the sunk cost with ‡ow-equivalent value f X . The e¤ective rate of time discount, + , takes into account the probability of …rm exit. This expression is written as the discounted sum of the stock value of pro…ts generated by the ‡ow of new hires at each age; as such, it already incorporates information 1 2 The upper limit of integration x denotes …rms who are furthest away from investing than any other …rm.
about worker exit and on-the-job contact probabilities as part of the discounting in the future stream of pro…ts in ( ).
Firms choose the age at which to implement the better technology. In the case with international trade, this will be the age at which they begin to export. Consider a …rm that invests at h. If that …rm delays the investment at that age, it incurs two types of opportunity costs. First, it has the opportunity cost of not implementing the better technology, which reduces output per worker on the stock of workers available at h. Second, it reduces the in ‡ow of workers at each age below h, because a higher switching age h increases the time until investment, x = h a, for all a < h. As a consequence of these two e¤ects, (h a) in (7) shifts down for all a. On the other hand, by delaying the time of investment at h, the …rm has marginal savings on its costs for an amount of f X . 13 These marginal costs and bene…ts from delaying the investment are re ‡ected in the …rst-order condition of the …rm's problem. In any positive solution for the switching age, it satis…es: 14
where
I will refer to the function S (h) as the stock e¤ ect of a delay in h. It captures the marginal opportunity costs of delaying the age of switching. As shown in (8) , the …rm chooses the h where these marginal costs are equal to the marginal savings in …xed costs, f X . It is possible that the stock e¤ect is never large enough, relative to the …xed cost, to justify the investment. This could occur, for example, if the …rm never grows too large. In this case, as shown in (9), the …rm chooses not to invest.
The value of a …rm in (7) can also be formulated as ( + ) (h) = (h) 0 (h). Letting e max h (h) be the value of the …rm at entry when it chooses the switching age optimally, in an interior solution (i.e. where 0 (h) = 0) it must be that
Hence, when h is chosen optimally, the value of the …rm at entry is the same as if the …rm obtained the value of all workers who are hired at the moment of entry (i.e., when x = h) in every period.
This expression will be useful in the characterization of the general equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates the basic trade-o¤ faced by the …rm. It depicts the evolution, as the …rm ages, of the value (h a) generated by new workers in a …rm that switches at h. After h, the …gure and to the left of h. When a …rm delays the investment from a generic age b h up to the optimal age h, it reduces the value generated by all workers attracted before b h. This loss, represented by the shadowed area A, constitutes the stock e¤ect. But it gains, thanks to lower costs, in terms of the value generated by all workers attracted after b h and before h, represented by the shadowed area B. The …rm's decision balances these marginal losses and gains. When the switching age is chosen optimally, (11) holds. In this case the ‡ow value of the …rm at entry is equal to the intercept of the …gure. This intercept lies above (0) f X , the ‡ow value of investing at birth, which always constitutes a feasible choice.
Since the …rm grows over time, the longer it waits, the larger is the opportunity cost of not exercising the investment; this is re ‡ected in that S 0 (h) > 0, which implies that the pro…t function is strictly concave. Furthermore, S (0) = 0, i.e. there is no stock e¤ect at entry because there is no initial labor force; so it must be that h > 0 unless the sunk cost of upgrading technology is zero, in which case investment occurs right away. Finally, S (h) is bounded, which implies that the …rm actually intends to invest, i.e. h is a …nite number, if and only if the …xed cost of investing is not too large. 15 The switching age of a …rm is a¤ected by various parameters and aggregate variables. We can infer from Figure 1 that the stock e¤ect is stronger, and therefore investment takes place earlier, the steeper is the rise in with …rm age. This increment re ‡ects two margins: the rise in the number of new hires and the rise in the discounted revenues generated by the average worker as the …rm ages. The latter occurs because, as the …rm ages, it approaches the time of switching into the high-productivity technology. Substituting the expressions for the value of each match from (1) to (3) into the present value of pro…ts generated by all workers who enter at x, (x) in (6), the 1 5 This follows from …rm size being bounded; if ! 0 (no exogenous separations) then h is necessarily …nite.
integrand in the stock e¤ect in (10) takes the form
Forces that generate an increase in this expression reduce the switching age, while an increase in f X delays it. In the "revenue" margin, larger values of y D or accelerate the investment. More frequent separations, captured by a larger , produce the opposite e¤ect by making it less likely that a new worker will remain in the …rm until the time of investing, diminishing the value of the current stock. In the "new hires" margin, either a higher contact rate with unemployed or with employed workers leads to an increase in the number of new hires and to earlier investment.
Interactions among …rms in the labor market occur through the number of …rms and the employment distribution. A larger number of …rms M delays investment because it increases competition for workers, shrinking the number of meetings experienced by the …rm. Similarly, a …rst-order shift in the employment distribution G (x) towards low-x …rms delays the investment because it makes it more likely that a worker contacted from another job is employed in a …rm that is close to investing, reducing the share of meetings that translate into new hires.
Summarizing the results from this section: 16 Proposition 1 In an interior solution, a …rm chooses the unique h where (8) holds. The …rm never invests at entry unless f X = 0, but eventually invests if and only if f X is below some …nite threshold. At an interior solution, h is decreasing in y D , , u and e , and increasing in f X , ,
M , and a …rst-order shift in G (x).
For what follows, the main implication of this proposition is that a more ‡exible labor market leads to earlier investment, while more competition, through either the measure of rival …rms or the distribution of employment across them, delays the investment of an individual …rm. These are partial-equilibrium results. To assess the full impact of labor market conditions on investment and income we need to move on to the general equilibrium, where the intensity of competition is determined endogenously, as I do next.
3 Single-Country Equilibrium in equilibrium they must all invest at the same time after birth, H. This common switching age induces a number of new endogenous objects: the distribution across …rms of the time until switch P (x), the share of high-productivity …rms m X , the share of employment in these …rms e X and 1 6 Formal proofs are relegated to the appendix.
aggregate productivity y. In equilibrium, these variables must be such that a number of conditions hold. First, each individual …rm, taking these variables as given, solves the problem in the previous section and optimizes over its choice of h. Second, …rms must not have incentives to deviate from the common decision H. Third, the number of …rms, M , must be such that the free entry condition is satis…ed.
I proceed to de…ne these aggregate variables, then I move to the de…nition and characterization of the equilibrium, and …nally I show the comparative statics. Throughout this section the productivity gap is still exogenous, so that the model describes a closed economy where …rms make a choice between technologies with di¤erent productivity. Using the results from the single-country equilibrium, in the next section we will be able to characterize the impact of labor market policies on trade and income in an open economy setup.
The growth of a …rm depends on where it is located relative to other …rms in terms of time to invest. Across the economy, the share of …rms that are less than x periods away from investing equals the fraction of …rms that have survived beyond age H x. Since the constant death rate
generates an exponential distribution of ages, the share of …rms that are at less than x periods from switching is
Due to random matching and the common search e¤ort for workers across …rms, workers in either unemployment or employment who make contact with a potential new employer have a probability P (x; H) of sampling one that is less than x periods away from switching. The pattern of transitions from high-x …rms into low-x …rms gives the steady-state distribution across employees of the time until switch of their employer: 17
The shape of this distribution responds monotonically to …rst-order shifts in P ( ); a change in the …rm distribution towards stronger competitors (i.e., an increase in P ( ) for each x) naturally translates into a rise in G ( ).
From the …rm and employment distributions evaluated at x = 0 we …nd, respectively, the share of high-productivity …rms and the share of employment allocated to these …rms:
The share of …rms with productivity y X (i.e., exporters in the open-economy setting of the next section) is simply given by the fraction of …rms that has survived beyond age H. The assumption of a common search e¤ort across …rms implies that m X represents also the probability that a worker who learns about a job does so about one in a high-productivity …rm. The fact that workers ‡ow from type D …rms into type X …rms then yields the expression for e X .
In the aggregate economy, output per employed worker is endogenous. It equals the employmentweighted average of productivity across …rms:
The term in curly brackets represents the endogenous part of TFP. Hence, in the end, this theory is about the determination of e X , the share of employment in high-productivity jobs, as a way of explaining aggregate income. The common switching age H is su¢ cient statistic for these aggregate variables.
The value of unemployment w u is linked to aggregate income. The take-it-or-leave structure implies that w u equals the income ‡ow of unemployed workers. I assume that this value is chosen by the government, which levies a lump-sum tax to compensate each unemployed worker on a basis relative to income per worker in the economy:
By increasing b the government raises the transfer received by each unemployed worker as a share of income per employed worker, irrespective of the unemployment rate. Below, I consider how changes in this policy variable a¤ect the endogenous variables.
The distributions that we have just introduced, as well as income per employee, are all functions of H. Through its e¤ect on these variables, H impacts the decision of …rms characterized in the previous section. To denote this dependency, I write now the stock e¤ect de…ned in (10) as S (h; H).
In an interior equilibrium, the …rst-order condition is
This condition gives the age for investment h chosen by an individual …rm, taking the group of aggregate variables a¤ected by H as given. In equilibrium this decision must be consistent across …rms; i.e.,
Finally, …rms face entry or overhead expenses with ‡ow-equivalent value of f D units of the …nal good. Using the value of a new …rm e from (11), the free-entry condition implies that a potential entrant must be indi¤erent about entering, 18
where the value of …rms at entry, (h; H), is expressed as a function of H, too.
Existence and Uniqueness of a Single-Country Equilibrium
We are now in position to de…ne an equilibrium.
De…nition 1 A single-country equilibrium consists of labor market outcomes fh; H; M g, distributions fP ( ) ; G ( )g, shares of …rms and employment fm X ; e X g, output per worker y, consumption c and unemployment value w u such that:
a) the …rst-order condition (19) from the …rms' optimization problem holds; b) the individual and the common age for switching are consistent, (20); c) the number of …rms adjusts to satisfy free entry, (21); d) the …rm and employment distributions are given, respectively, by (13) and (14); e) the shares of high-productivity …rms and of employment in these …rms are given, respectively, by (15) and (16); f ) output per worker is given by (17); g) the value of unemployment is given by (18) ; and h) goods market clear. 19 My next step is to establish equilibrium existence and uniqueness. To do so, it is useful to de…ne the function (h; H) as the ratio of the stock e¤ect of an individual …rm at its optimal choice to the common value of …rms at entry. Using (19) and (21) we have that, in equilibrium, this (free entry adjusted) stock e¤ect equals the cost of upgrading technology relative to operative costs,
Implicit in this equation is the reaction of each …rm, h, to the common switching age H. This response is depicted in Figure 2 , that shows condition (22) in the space of h and H for two levels of upgrading cost, f X;0 < f X;1 .
An equilibrium consists of an H that satis…es (H; H) = f X =f D , i.e. when the schedule depicted in Figure 2 intersects the 45 line. Since the adjusted stock e¤ect increases with h, uniqueness can be examined based on whether the incentive to invest for each …rm at the equilibrium increases when other …rms delay investment. To verify this, we must take into account that (h; H) simultaneously accounts for two margins, the stock e¤ect and the value of …rms at entry. Forces that increase the former lead to a lower h, while forces that increase the latter lead to more entry, increasing competition and delaying h. We must ask, then, how these two forces respond to changes in H.
On the one hand, a larger H shifts the distribution of employment G (x; H) towards …rms that are further from investing; as we know from the previous section, this strengthens the stock e¤ect.
On the other hand, if …rms take longer to invest, productivity y in (17) shrinks. The value of This induces entry and weakens the stock e¤ect. 20 Summing up, a larger H a¤ects h through one negative-feedback channel (distribution of competitors) and one positive-feedback channel (worker's value of unemployment). In order to make progress, we can impose a su¢ cient condition on the parameters to ensure that the positive-feedback e¤ect is weaker, namely:
This condition requires that transfers to unemployed workers and the productivity di¤erential (i.e., the revenue-di¤erential of exporters in a trade environment) are not too large relative to contacts made by employed workers. 21 When (23) holds, we can guarantee that the equilibrium H is unique. 22 As for existence, we have, as in the partial equilibrium case, that there are no stock e¤ects at entry, (0; H) = 0 for any H. Therefore, immediate investment of every …rm cannot be an outcome if f X > 0. An alternative candidate for an equilibrium is that …rms never invest in the 2 0 Later investment by competitors also implies that …rms can attract more workers in every period, which is re ‡ected in a larger upper limit of integration x = H in (6). However, the consistency condition (20) determines that this second e¤ect disappears at the equilibrium. See the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix A.2. 2 1 The larger are and b and the lower is e, the greater is the increase in the value of unemployment that results from a reduction in H, in a context where …rms rely relatively more on workers hired from unemployment to grow. This results in a stronger positive-feedback channel from larger H.
2 2 See Appendix A.2 for proof. This condition depends on three parameters: f e; b; g. In the case of the exporting decision, we can impose natural restrictions on their values from readily available data to assess its validity. The share of GDP used to …nance unemployment bene…ts in the model is bu= (1 u), and from the OECD Social Expenditure Database, public spending on unemployment compensation as a fraction of GDP among OECD member countries has been on average 1% between 1980 and 2000. Jolivet et al. (2006) estimate the rate of contact on the job to be strictly lower than that from unemployment in each of eleven OECD countries since the mid-90's, implying e= u < 1. Average unemployment in the OECD since 1980 has been 7:7%. From these values, (23) determines an upper threshold for of 1:8 when e= u = 0:01, and increasing in this ratio. E.g., for e= u = 0:1, approximately the value found in Jolivet et al. (2006) for France and for the UK, must be smaller than 5. In turn, Mayer and Ottaviano (2010) …nd an exporter value-added premium of 2:7 in France and 1:3 in the UK. This raw evidence suggests that inequality (23) is not too stringent. high-productivity technology. As in the partial equilibrium, the (free entry adjusted) stock e¤ect (h; H) is bounded, and …rms invest if and only if
i.e., whenever the sunk costs of upgrading are not too large relative to the cost of entry into the market. 23 Summarizing the results from this section, we have Proposition 2 The equilibrium is unique. Firms never invest at entry if f X > 0, but eventually invests if and only if f X =f D < f X =f D .
Comparative statics: Labor Market Environment and Productivity
I proceed now to show comparative statics about the impact of the labor market environment on productivity. The discussion from the previous section implies that changes in parameters that raise the adjusted stock e¤ect (H; H) for every H also result in a lower age for switching, biasing the distribution of employment towards more productive …rms and raising aggregate productivity.
Proposition 3
The switching age H and output per worker y are independent from the contact rate from unemployment u . H is decreasing, and y, e X and m X are increasing, in contact rates on the job e , transfers to unemployed workers as a fraction of income per worker b, the productivity di¤ erential , and the cost of entry relative to the cost of upgrading f D =f X .
The irrelevance of u for the time of investment is a re ‡ection of free entry. A higher contact rate with unemployed workers increases …rms'rate of new hires from unemployment, but it also reduces the size of the unemployment pool. For an individual …rm, this results in a positive proportional impact on the stock e¤ect and on …rm value. But the number of …rms adjusts through free entry and competition heightens, o¤setting this partial-equilibrium e¤ect. In contrast, the frequency of contacts on the job e has a non-proportional impact on the stock e¤ect. It only strengthens the new hires margin in (12) through the higher entry rate of workers from other jobs. Variation in the number of …rms cannot absorb this e¤ect as with u , and the adjustment occurs both through the number of …rms and through the common age for switching. Broadly speaking, higher e stretches the size distribution and bene…ts larger and older …rms relatively more, while u a¤ects all …rms in the same proportion.
Unemployment compensation b has an inverse e¤ect relative to u , in that it is irrelevant in partial equilibrium but it a¤ects H in general equilibrium. In the partial-equilibrium analysis of Section 2, a higher value of unemployment reduces the value of …rms by a constant amount, thereby leaving the trade-o¤ between the stock e¤ect and the …xed cost of investing unchanged. But in general equilibrium, this reduction in …rm value compresses the number of …rms via free entry. This alleviates competition for workers in the labor market, allowing each …rm to grow faster.
Qualitatively, the comparative statics on the impact of e and b on productivity are similar to those in Shimer (1999, 2000) . Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) show that higher unemployment insurance makes risk-averse workers search for high-wage jobs, inducing …rms to invest more in their own productivity. Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) show that worker search might be e¢ ciency-enhancing when heterogeneous technologies are chosen by ex-ante identical …rms. The current model has similar outcomes, but they are generated through a di¤erent mechanism; namely, the impact of search on the job and unemployment compensation on the stock e¤ect.
Size distribution
In this economy, workers transit from young and small …rms into old and large …rms. Firms are continually exiting and being replaced by small entrants. This process originates a distribution of …rm sizes. What does the model imply for its shape? In the data, a common feature of the size distribution of …rms is a decreasing density in the upper tail. We can show that job-to-job transitions are necessary for the density not to be increasing in its entire domain, which would contradict this empirical evidence.
Proposition 4
If the …rm exit rate is lower than the rate of individual job termination ( < ), then if job-to-job transitions are not allowed ( e = 0), the distribution of …rm sizes has an increasing density in the entire domain; while if job-to-job transitions are allowed ( e > 0), there is a region in the distribution of …rm sizes that has a decreasing density when the age of investment is su¢ ciently high.
To understand this result, we can use a condition that holds whenever the density is decreasing.
Let N (h) be the size of …rms of age h and f (n) be the density of the distribution of …rm sizes.
This condition shows that there are two forces competing to determine the slope of f (n):
changes in net worker ‡ows N 0 (h) by …rm age and the exit rate . Intuitively, if …rm growth decelerates too fast and …rms do not exit often, there is a tendency for …rms to cluster at some point in the size distribution, which results in an increasing density. 24 Absent any transitions between jobs ( e = 0), net ‡ows slow down at the rate of job separations, N 00 (h) =N 0 (h) = .
Then (25) implies that f 0 (n) > 0 if the rate of …rm exit is below that of job separation . Indeed, < is what we see in the data. This means that, absent job-to-job transitions, there are no hopes in this model to generate a realistic distribution of …rm sizes.
On the other hand, when e > 0, there are two opposing forces: a constant number of workers is attracted in each period from unemployment at any …rm size, but as …rms age they attract progressively more worker from other …rms. The …rst e¤ect dominates at …rm entry and the second dominates when …rms are large enough but still do not invest. Therefore, if …rms invest at a su¢ ciently old age, there is a region in the distribution of …rm sizes where the density is decreasing. 25 It is worth contrasting these properties with the outcome in Acemoglu and Hawkins (2010),
where the slow hiring of …rms in a frictional labor market also induces a distribution of …rm sizes, but where there are no transitions between jobs or investment in productivity. As they note, the size distribution originating in their case has an increasing density; here, transitions from young and small …rms who are far from investing into old and large …rms are necessary for the distribution of …rm sizes to exhibit a decreasing density in some part of its domain, as it is typically observed in the data.
International Trade
We can proceed now to the interaction between labor market frictions, trade, and income. Here, I show results on the impact of frictions, unemployment transfers and trade barriers on exports and income. In the next section, I will use a calibrated model to illustrate the impact of changes in the labor market and trading environments on welfare.
Suppose that there are two economies like the one described in the previous section, home and foreign. They di¤er, potentially, in labor market fundamentals f u ; e ; bg and relative …xed costs f X =f D . Foreign country variables are denoted with an asterisk. From now on, I refer to the two types of …rms that I have analyzed so far as exporting and domestic (i.e., selling only in the domestic market). The productivity advantage of type-X …rms, , is now a revenue advantage. All …rms have the same physical productivity, but exporters generate more value for the same quantity of output. The main di¤erence with the previous sections is that now is endogenous.
Trade Environment
The trade environment shares the central features of Krugman (1980) . Monopolistically competitive …rms sell varieties of a di¤erentiated good. These varieties are aggregated in each economy in the production of a …nal non-tradable good using a technology with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) > 1 across varieties. Exporters face iceberg trade costs , that potentially di¤er across economies.
A known feature of this framework is that product di¤erentiation leads to downward sloping demand and concave revenue-functions. As …rms expand their supply, consumers derive a progressively lower marginal utility from a particular variety. In order to incorporate the linear revenue functions that I have used in the analysis so far into a trade setting, I extend this basic CES framework with a quality choice by …rms. Thanks to investing in quality, …rms can shift their demand curves outwards instead of necessarily sliding them down as they o¤er more output. In section A.3 of the appendix, I show that when workers are perfectly substitutable inside the …rm between the production of quality and quantity, both e¤ects exactly compensate as the …rm expands. As a result, the willingness of consumers to pay for a variety remains constant as the …rm producing that variety increases supply. I adopt this speci…cation for analytical convenience. 26 In this setup, the revenue premium of exporters takes the form:
re ‡ects the size of the home economy in terms of its price index P and income per capita. 27 Therefore, from (26) we see that depends on
From the perspective of an individual …rm, the relative size of the foreign economy increases due to less competition (higher P =P ) or higher demand (higher y =y), resulting in a larger . The revenue premium re ‡ects that, by exporting, …rms can sell to consumers who have on average a higher willingness to pay for its products. Revenues of each type of …rm are measured in terms of the domestic non-tradable good. 28 In the previous sections, we have treated as parameter. Proposition 3 shows how the fraction of high-productivity …rms -now, exporters-and the share of employment in these …rms react to this premium. I denote these reduced-form responses from the previous section as m X ( ) and 2 6 Decreasing marginal revenues would constitute an additional determinant of the marginal value of jobs. This e¤ect would come at great analytical cost without much theoretical insight. Furthermore, it is not necessary to match salient properties of the data on …rm dynamics and job-to-job transitions. See the quantitative part in Section 6. 2 7 In the terminology of Redding and Venables (2004) , is the "market access" and p is the "market capacity" of the home country. McGrattan and Prescott (2008) derive an expression similar to in (26) in an open economy setting with perfectly competitive product markets and decreasing returns in production. In their case, the productivity increase results from diversi…cation of resources across destinations by multinational …rms. 2 8 Revenues per worker in domestic …rms, yD, will now also react to changes in the trading environment. Due to monopolistic competition, the value of sales depends on market size, which is a¤ected by trade. As implied by (51) in Appendix A.3, we have now that yD = [(1 u) y]
1= . This introduces one minor practical di¤erence with our previous analysis of the single-country equilibrium. Replacing the value for yD in our expression for aggregate productivity, y, de…ned in (17) , gives y = (1 u) 1) . We still have, as in the single-country case, that reductions in H raise y; now they do so in a larger magnitude due to the feedback between income and demand characteristic of monopolistic competition. e X ( ). Now, we are interested in examining how trade determines , and, through this "price", the response in these aggregate variables.
Equilibrium de…nition and uniqueness
The solution for the aggregate variables in the home and foreign countries can be divided in two interdependent blocks of equations. A …rst block yields exports in each country given . As shown in the appendix, exporters in the home country sell abroad at price p, and ship abroad a fraction of their output equal to
The total value of exports from the home country is thus
where Q X ( ) = (1 u) e X ( ) s X ( ) are exported units of output.
The second block of equations concerns the relation between the two economies through the balance of payments. The revenue premia and must be such that trade balances, X ( ) = X ( ). Using (28) and rearranging terms, we can write this balanced trade condition as
Note also that, from the de…nition of the exporter revenue premium in (26) , an increase in the exporter premium in one country is associated to a reduction in the premium in the other country,
Using these two blocks of equations, we can de…ne an equilibrium with two countries:
De…nition 2 An international trade equilibrium consists of revenue premia f ; g, a relative size of the foreign market p =p, and outcomes in each country eq fh; H; M; P ( ) ; G ( ) ; m X ; e X ; y; c; w u g and eq fh ; H ; M ; P ( ) ; G ( ) ; m X ; e X ; y ; c ; w u g such that a) Given f ; g, home and foreign country outcomes feq; eq g are single-country equilibria by De…nition 1; and b) f ; ; p =pg satisfy (29) and (30) .
As shown in the appendix, a larger exporter premium in the foreign economy must be met with a larger exporter premium in the trading partner for trade balance to hold. To ensure that exporters emerge in both countries I work henceforth under the assumption that the relative …xed cost of exporting f X =f D is su¢ ciently small, but positive, or that the upper bound for these costs in (24) is su¢ ciently large. In that way, I ensure existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
Firms respond in the same way to in both countries, hence trade balances by construction. Lower trade costs have naturally the e¤ect of making exports more pro…table through a larger . The same occurs in the comparison between pairs of countries trading in industries with di¤erent degrees of product di¤erentiation . The more di¤erentiated the industry (the lower is ), the larger the revenue advantage of exporters; comparative statics within country follow as in the single-country response to a larger . 29 Meanwhile, taking and as given, changes in labor market variables or in …xed costs do not a¤ect the revenue premium. Therefore, when we start from a symmetric con…guration and changes in parameters occur simultaneously in both economies, the results in Proposition 3 imply the following.
Corollary 1
In a trade equilibrium with symmetric countries, higher contact rates on the job e or unemployment transfers b, and lower trade barriers , demand elasticity or relative costs of exporting f X =f D , lead to a reduction in the age for entry into exporting H and to an increase in income per worker y, in export participation m X , and in the share of employment in exporting …rms e X in both countries.
The central implication of this result is that trading partners gain from the joint implementation of labor market policies that facilitate transitions between jobs or more generous compensation to unemployed workers. In the quantitative exercises below, I also consider the implications on welfare. 30 I ask next how policies in the foreign country a¤ect the domestic economy through trade.
We can show that labor market policies that favor export participation in the foreign economy have a positive impact on income in the home country and in exports in both countries.
Suppose that countries are asymmetric, and consider an increase in unemployment compensation or in the rate of job-to-job transitions abroad. From Proposition 3, these changes imply a reduction in the common age for switching H given , causing an increase in exports from the foreign country. The trade balance condition (29) then requires that the larger quantity imported by the home country is met with a higher . In the new steady state there is a higher exporter premium in the domestic economy, and a lower one in the foreign country. This outcome resembles the standard adverse response in terms of trade faced by specialized countries that experience a productivity shock, common to many open-economy models. To see the …nal outcome in each country, we must feed back these changes in and into the single-country responses. Following similar steps we can characterize the impact of a reduction in trade barriers faced by exporters in the home country. The results are summarized as follows.
Proposition 6
In a trade equilibrium with asymmetric countries, an increase in the rate of contacts on the job e or in compensation to unemployed workers in the foreign country b leads to an increase in the share of exporting …rms and in the share of employment in these …rms in both countries, and to an increase in income y in the home country. A reduction in trade barriers faced by home exporters leads to an increase in the share of exporting …rms, in the share of employment in these …rms and in income y in the home country. it promotes an increase in export participation. If this were the overall response, trade would not be balanced. However, at impact, this also raises income per worker in the foreign market, increasing the exporter revenue premium in the home country. As a result, …rms in the home country also reduce the age for switching into exporting, and output exported by home …rms adjusts up to the point that trade balances again. In the new equilibrium, both countries have a larger share of employment in the export sector. 31 The fact that it takes time for …rms to export ultimately generates these e¤ects. As in Krugman (1980), there are no exogenous di¤erences in productivity; but as in Melitz (2003) , there is selection based on …rm size. Older …rms are larger and select into exporting. In Krugman (1980) , in order for trade to balance, an increase in the size of an economy is met in equilibrium by an increase in the incentives to export to that country. While in that model this occurs through the appreciation of the real wage in the economy experiencing the positive shock (i.e., the home market e¤ect)
to induce entry or exit of …rms (all of whom are exporters), here the adjustment to a change in conditions occurs through the revenue premia of both countries, to induce an earlier or later age 3 1 The positive correlation between transfers to unemployed workers and openness echoes the empirical results of Rodrik (1998) , who …nds a positive link between government spending and openness. This result is interpreted as re ‡ecting that governments increase spending to compensate workers for the risk associated with globalization. The present model suggests the reversed causality: countries that compensate unemployed workers to a greater extent turn out to be more open. of switching. In this sense, the margin of adjustment shares the spirit of Melitz (2003) , in that it derives from worker reallocations towards high-productivity …rms (in our case, high-revenue …rms) and from …rms switching export status.
Proposition 6 establishes results about the e¤ect of independent changes in trade barriers and in the labor market environment on income per employed worker and trade. I have not yet inquired about the impact of changes in these variables on welfare, or about the interaction between both changes in policy. I address these issues in the quantitative exercise of Section 6.
Patterns of Firm Dynamics and Job-to-Job Mobility in the Data
In this section I show that the model predictions are qualitatively consistent with salient patterns of …rm dynamics and job-to-job mobility seen in the data. In the next section I will use these moments of the data to quantitatively evaluate the main e¤ects in the theory. In the vertical axis it shows average log-employment, demeaned by industry-year, of non exporters, exporters, and exporters to more than 5 countries. These are plotted against 25 age quantiles within industry-year-export status, plus the top 1% within these groups. Entrants appear at age zero. 32 There are three salient patterns in this …gure. First, as it is well known in the industrial organization literature, older …rms are larger. 33 Second, exporters are larger than non-exporters conditioning for age, as are …rms that export to many countries relative to …rms that export to few countries. Furthermore, the gap between types widens over time. 34 Third, the age quantiles of non-exporters are more concentrated in low ages relative to exporters, as are those of exporters to any number of countries relative to exporters to at least 5 countries. This re ‡ects that exporters are relatively older. The rise in export participation as …rms age is depicted in Figure 4 . It shows the average fraction of exporters to any number of countries, and of exporters to at least 5 countries, within 25 age quantiles within industry-year, plus the top 1%. Entrants appear again at age zero. About 30% of …rms in the oldest 5% are exporters, while on average across cohorts born between 1998 and 2003, 2% of …rms are born as exporters and 10% export during their …rst 5 years of age. 35 These positive correlations between age and size, and between age and export status, naturally underlie the well known fact that larger …rms are more likely to export. This is shown in Figure 5 .
The …gure presents the share of exporters, and of exporters to at least 5 destinations, for 25 groups of size (in number of workers) plus the top 1% within industry-year. Only 1% of the smallest 5% of …rms export, in contrast with 60% in the largest 5%, and the share of …rms exporting to more than 5 countries rises sharply towards the highest percentiles of the size distribution. 36 The baseline theory in this paper is able to reproduce, qualitatively, these patterns of the data.
The activity of …nding and hiring workers is not immediate, and as such generates an adjustment cost that drives the evolution in the stock of workers. Therefore, older …rms are larger. The correlation between age, size and export status arises from the waiting time of …rms until they have enough workers to justify paying the …xed costs to export. On the other hand, di¤erences in the rates at which …rms of di¤erent export status accumulate workers are a re ‡ection of random assignment of workers to …rms and search on the job. By exporting, …rms do not only increase their revenues, but they also become stronger competitors in the labor market and grow faster. 37 Complementary forces other than slow labor adjustments might contribute to the patterns in …gures 3 to 5. One can think, for example, of slow capital accumulation or learning about exporting. 38 A distinguishing feature of my analysis, absent from such explanations, is that it has implications for job-to-job mobility. Employed workers hold better outside options than unemployed workers, and so do workers employed in exporting …rms relative to workers employed in nonexporters. By o¤ering jobs of higher value than non-exporters, exporters are more likely to hire workers away from other …rms rather than from the unemployment pool, as well as from other exporters rather than from non-exporters. As we have seen, these patterns in the composition of new hires constitute the core of the mechanism underlying the comparative statics -labor market frictions a¤ect aggregate outcomes only when job-to-job transitions are present. In what follows, I
show that these patterns in the composition of new hires are present in the data, and in the next section I use the observed rates of job-to-job hiring by export status to parametrize the model. Consider, …rst, the share of new hires entering …rms from other jobs. Figure 6 , constructed using the same population of …rms as the previous …gures, presents for each year between 1999 and 2007 the average, across manufacturing …rms, in the share of new hires attracted from another formal job in the economy, split in the three groups by export status. 39 The complement of this fraction Figure 6 : Share of new hires attracted from formal jobs among all new hires, by year and export status corresponds to workers attracted from either unemployment or from the informal employment sector. On average in the entire sample period, 37% of all new hires in …rms that export to more than 5 countries enter from jobs in the formal employment sector, in contrast to 25% in …rms that export to no more than 5 countries and to 15% in non-exporters. Similarly, workers employed by manufacturing exporters are harder to attract than workers in manufacturing non-exporters. Figure   7 shows that the greater the intensity of export activity, the higher the chances to lure workers from exporters. 40 The ranking in …gures 6 and 7 holds markedly throughout all the years in the sample, although it covers two very distinct phases of the macroeconomic cycle. 41 In Appendix B, I
show that the di¤erences in the composition of new hires by number of destinations are statistically signi…cant when controlling for industry-year e¤ects as well as for …rm age, size, average wage and net job creation.
Arguably, the combined e¤ect of other forces may contribute to the patterns in …gures 3 to 7. 42 The theory in this paper qualitatively generates them all based on a single mechanism. In the next section, I perform a quantitative evaluation of the theory. The pace of the downturn and the recovery, in terms of number of …rms and total employment, was similar for exporting and non-exporting …rms. 4 2 E.g., it is possible to envision a model incorporating alternative drivers of …rm dynamics, di¤erences in skill requirements by export status, and variation in unemployment incidence by skill group. To my knowledge, no paper investigated this route. Note that labor market frictions would also have an e¤ect on aggregate outcomes in the presence of these forces, a¤ecting hiring costs by skill as well as the timing skill-biased investments. Disentangling the relative importance of these alternative e¤ects lies beyond the reach of this paper, but is interesting for future work. I also want to assess how good a theory of the …rm life cycle this is, based on the model's ability to reproduce some of the patterns in Section 5. To these ends, it is necessary to include additional ingredients. I introduce three extensions: two export destinations, endogenous recruitment e¤ort, and ex-ante di¤erences across …rms.
Extensions to the basic model
I motivate each of the extensions in contrast to properties of the model developed so far, referred to as the "basic model".
Two export destinations I assume that there are two export markets, k = 1; 2. As …gures 3 to 7 show, the patterns in the data are not just about exporting, but rather about the intensity of export activity as measured by the number of destinations. Also, as we have seen, the inclusion of more than one destination helps to generate a size distribution of …rms with realistic shape.
Proposition 4 says that if …rms become exporters very early in life the basic model necessarily implies a size distribution with increasing density in a large interval of the domain; with more than one export destination this restriction can be relaxed.
Endogenous recruitment e¤ort In the basic model …rms are not able to choose the number of workers that they sample per period. This …xes the ratio between the average size of exporters and non-exporters at 1 + e , restricting the share of exporting …rms and the share of employment in these …rms to move in the same proportion. This needs not be the case if …rms can choose the recruitment e¤ort s in (4), since in that case …rms with higher valuation for meeting new workers can recruit more aggressively. Following Bertola and Caballero (1994) among others, I assume a convex cost of search, c (s) = s with > 1. 43 Heterogeneity In the spirit of Melitz (2003) , I allow for ex-ante di¤erences across …rms in productivity, , and …xed costs, . The patterns of export participation over age and size in From the proof of Lemma 1 in Appendix A.1, the value of a new job is now
Extended Firm problem
With respect to the value of a job in (3), this expression adds productivity as a shifter of revenues and an additional export destination. Using (53) in the appendix and normalizing the domestic price index to 1, revenues per unit of output of domestic …rms and each exporter type are
where Y 0 is home aggregate income and A k
( 1) k P k Y k for k = 1; 2 re ‡ects the size of foreign market k.
To characterize the …rm problem, we must consider new aggregate variables. The basic model was structured around the observation that the time to switch into exporting was a su¢ cient statistic for the value of a new job. Given the employment distribution across times until switch, G (x), we knew the share of workers that a …rm at x could hire among all contacted workers. In the current scenario this no longer holds, but we can determine the return on search by considering the distribution of employment across …rms o¤ering jobs with di¤erent value, G v (v). Given this distribution, …rms know the yield on their search e¤ort, and subsequently decide how much to search. In the appendix, I show that from the search decision of …rms we can obtain an expression, equivalent to (6) , for the value of all workers who enter a …rm with productivity at x, now denoted as (x; ).
Using (x; ) from (57) in the appendix, we can rewrite the …rm's problem (7) . Firms are born as domestic producers, but they can now access two markets k = 1; 2 by paying entry costs with ‡ow equivalent values of f k . Now, f k is a component of entry costs in market k that is common across …rms and is …rm speci…c. Let h 1 be the age at which the …rm chooses to enter market 1 and h 2 be the lapse before the …rm enters market 2 after it has entered market 1. The problem of the …rm is now to choose h 1 and h 2 to maximize its value at entry.
We can show that the solution to this extended …rm problem has, as before, a simple structure based on the stock e¤ect. Similarly to (10), we can de…ne S 1 ( ) as the change, after a delay in the time of entry into market 1, in the present discounted value of all workers attracted between ages 0 and h 1 ; and S 2 ( ) as the change, after a delay in the age of entry into market 2, in the value of all workers attracted between ages h 1 and h 1 + h 2 . 44 In an interior solution the …rm chooses h 1 and h 2 that satisfy
There are some novel features in these …rst order conditions compared to the basic model. Stock e¤ects depend now on …rm-speci…c productivity and …xed costs. We also have that h 2 a¤ects the incentives to enter in market 1 through the value of a worker attracted before h 1 . And the timing of entry depends on a combination of the relative …xed costs and revenue di¤erentials in each market.
This solution to the …rm's problem was derived under the assumption that the …rm enters …rst in market 1. Proposition 7 summarizes the comparative statics on the …rm's decision and presents a su¢ cient condition such that this is indeed the outcome.
Proposition 7
At an interior solution, (i) ages of entry into both markets are decreasing in productivity and increasing in the cost shifter ; (ii) the lower are f 2 =f 1 or ( 12 1 ) = ( 1 1), the earlier the …rm enters in export market 2 given the age of entry into market 1; and (iii) if the …rm enters in both markets and
, it enters …rst in market 1.
Calibration
In the appendix, I de…ne a general equilibrium of the extended model. Using the equilibrium conditions from De…nition 3 in Appendix A.4, I solve the model numerically and choose parameters to match aggregate moments for the manufacturing sector in Argentina for the period 2003 to 2007.
The calibration strategy is as follows. First, some parameters are set to match their empirical counterparts. The exit rate of …rms is set at = 0:075 to …t the density of the age distribution.
The exogenous job separation rate is set to = 0:15, to match the probability that workers employed in non-exiting …rms move into the unemployment pool within the year. The unemployment rate is set at the average rate over the period of u = 10% according to the Argentine institute of statistics.
The rate of time discount matches an average interest rate of 6% on deposits at the fourth quarter of each year according to the Argentine Central Bank. The elasticity of demand equals 3, as in the estimate of Eaton et al. (2008b) . I normalize the operative …xed cost to f 0 = 10, and I set the …rm speci…c shifter of exporting costs to be uniformly distributed between 0 and 2.
There are 8 remaining parameters: revenue premia f 1 ; 2 g, exporting costs ff 1 ; f 2 g, labor market fundamentals fb; e g, convexity in hiring costs , and the shape parameter in the distribution of productivity , which I assume to be Pareto. I choose their values to minimize the sum of squared residuals between the prediction of the model for ten aggregate moments and their empirical values. The two markets k = 1; 2 of the model correspond, in the data, to …rms exporting to up to 5 countries and to more than 5 countries. 45 I match moments from the data that correspond to the main aggregate outcomes predicted by the theory: the fraction of …rms exporting to di¤erent number of destinations, their shares of total employment, their average age, and their share of job-to-job transitions in new hires. The moments generated by the model as well as the targets in the data are reported in Table 1 . The model matches closely all targets except for the average age of exporters to more than 5 countries. Database. 46 The convexity in the labor adjustment cost is below the …nding by Yashiv and Merz (2007) for the U.S., but I do not include scale e¤ects which are present in their estimation and tend to reduce the e¤ective cost. Finally, the average exporting cost to at least 5 countries appears to be particularly large. However, the …rm-level shifter in the exporting costs implies the presence of …rms with arbitrarily small costs of exporting; the estimated average would be lower in the absence of this heterogeneity.
Calibrated Moments Model Data
Share of …rms exporting to up to 5 countries 8% 8% Share of …rms exporting to more than 5 countries 3% 3% Share of employment in exporters to up to 5 countries 21% 20% Share of employment in exporters to more than 5 countries 32% 33% Average age of non-exporters 12 12 Average age of exporters to up to 5 countries 16 19 Average age of exporters to more than 5 countries 17 28 Share of job-to-job hires in total hires of non-exporters 13% 16% Share of job-to-job hires in total hires of exporters to up to 5 countries 31% 27% Share of job-to-job hires in total hires of exporters to more than 5 countries 39% 40% Table 1 : Matched moments, model and data
Cross-Sectional Predictions
The central prediction of the theory is the timing of …rm entry into di¤erent export markets and the allocation of workers across …rms with di¤erent export status. Given the (exogenous) age and productivity distributions, these outcomes give the fraction of exporting …rms and their employment allocation. Since in the calibration I match these aggregate moments, a natural question is whether the model does a good job in replicating the pro…le of export participation over the …rm age and size distributions that we see in the data. The model fairly reproduces the increase in export participation for …rms younger than 30 years and the share of exporters to more than 5 countries across the size distribution, although it over-predicts the share of exporters among the largest …rms. Another question is whether the model can account for dispersion in …rm size by export status. Figure 9 shows the calibrated model's prediction for Figure 3 . It depicts the average (demeaned) log size of …rms with di¤erent export status within groups of age. There are two e¤ects generating the increase in size by export status in this …gure: growth of continuing …rms within each export group and selection of …rms between exports groups over age. As implied by Proposition 7, more e¢ cient and lower-cost …rms in the group of non-exporters select themselves into exporting as they age, while, within the group of exporters, more e¢ cient and lower-cost …rms select themselves into the group of …rms exporting to more destinations.
The model captures the growth rate within non-exporters that we see in the data, as well as the constant gap in size between exporters to di¤erent number of destinations. However, it fails to predict steady growth among exporters as seen in the data. This constant increase in log-size suggests the presence of forces not taken into account in the model. Natural candidates for this trend are accumulation of another resource, learning or size-dependency in the search technology.
Simulated Policies
I use the parametrized model to measure changes in welfare after changes in the trade and labor market environments. I simulate an increase in transfers to unemployed workers, and I ask about the di¤erential impact of a reduction in trade costs in labor market environments with di¤erent ‡exibility. This question has been the focus of recent quantitative explorations in di¤erent setups, such as Kambourov (2009) and Cosar (2010) . 47 The overall methodology is as follows. From the calibrated values of 1 and 2 and the value for aggregate income Y 0 that results from the calibration, I use equations (33) and (34) First, I simulate a 10% increase in the rate of transfers to unemployed workers b. The percent changes in total employment in exporters and in aggregate income and consumption appear in the …rst column of Table 2 . From the baseline theory, we know that this shock results in an increase in income for a given revenue di¤erential of exporters. At the calibrated parameters of the extended model, it results in a 2% increase in income and in a 1:5% increase in aggregate consumption or welfare. These gains occur through a 1:2% increase in the size of the workforce allocated to exporting …rms.
Second, I simulate a 10% reduction in trade costs to any destination under the calibrated value for e , and also under a more ‡exible labor market regime, where e is 10% larger. 48 In reduced form, the increase in e can be interpreted as deriving from policies that encourage on-the-job search, such as lower …ring costs. It can also be associated with a shift towards more decentralized bargaining schemes between …rms and workers, which would encourage the type of transitions and individual bargaining highlighted by the model. The second column in Table 2 reports the percent di¤erence between the change in aggregate outcomes due to the reduction in trade costs under the more and the less ‡exible labor market.
The impact of lower trade barriers is smaller in a more ‡exible environment. The increase in employment in exporting …rms resulting from 10% lower trade costs is about 10% smaller in the more ‡exible labor market environment, while the increase in welfare is about 15% smaller. Therefore, at the calibrated values for the parameters in Argentina, the economy exhibits no complementarity between higher labor market ‡exibility and lower trade costs. Under a more ‡exible labor market, a greater share of employment is allocated in exporting …rms and the revenue premium of exporters is smaller, resulting in a smaller impact of lower trade barriers.
Conclusion
In this paper I studied the impact of labor market frictions on aggregate outcomes in an economy where productivity upgrading or export participation require …xed-cost investments. I considered a theory where the growth of …rms takes time depending on frictions in the labor market; as a result, there is a period after birth during which …rms choose to use low-productivity technologies or to sell only at home. Slow growth generates dispersion in size and export activity among ex-ante identical …rms; older …rms are larger and more likely to export.
A critical feature of the analysis has been the existence of job-to-job transitions. Without them, there would be no role for frictions in a¤ecting the timing of investment and the model would be unable to generate a size distribution of …rms with realistic shape. At the aggregate level, the theory implies that lower barriers to job-to-job mobility and more generous unemployment compensation promote early investment, thus raising the volume of trade and income. It also shows that countries gain when these policies are implemented by trading partners.
I extended the theory to measure the impact of labor market and trade frictions on welfare.
Among other features, I included ex-ante di¤erences in productivity across …rms; in this context, more productive …rms enter foreign markets earlier and grow faster. I calibrated the model to match summary features of …rm and labor market dynamics in Argentina. The parametrized model generates a close description of the increase in export participation by …rm age and size for younger …rms. In the counter-factual exercise, gains from trade are predicted to be lower in a more ‡exible labor market environment.
This paper represents the …rst step towards fully grasping the aggregate implications of labor market frictions in an economy with …rm dynamics, job-to-job mobility, and …xed-cost investments that are key for productivity. The quantitative setup lends itself to extensions that are important for a complete account of the role of frictions, such as an endogenous matching rate between workers and …rms or heterogeneous skill requirements by export status. In addition, the analysis was limited to comparisons between steady states, but it would be interesting to use the model to study aggregate transitions after a change in the environment. These questions are left for future research. (2003) is that the splitting of the total surplus in j, v j , only depends on the total surplus in i. In particular, it occurs as if the worker used the total value in the previous employment, v i , as outside option in a bilateral bargaining with j in which the new …rm has monopsony power:
A Derivations and Proofs
By construction, W i;j satis…es
where ! i;j is the income ‡ow obtained by the worker at the moment of the transition from i to j and w u is the value for the worker if the match is dissolved. The term within brackets on the right-hand side is the value in the case of a contact with …rms o¤ering jobs with value higher than i, where dP k measures the probability of sampling …rm k and P k:vi v k is the measure of all …rms whose value is above v i . Using (37) and (38), changing the variable of integration to the distribution of values v 0 with associated sampling function dP v (v) and integrating by parts yields:
On the other hand, J i;j is given by:
where e y j is revenue per worker generated in …rm j and is allowed to ‡uctuate over time. Suppose that a worker employed in j meets a …rm j 0 whose total value is the same as in j, v j = v j 0 . In this instance, (37) and (38) lead to J j 0 ;j = 0 and W j 0 ;j = v j . On the other hand, dW + dJ = dv, the sum of the changes in value obtained by …rm and worker add up to the change in value of the job. This holds when a worker from i enters j, i.e. dW i;j + dJ i;j = dv j . The speci…c way how the change in total value is split pins down the evolution of the transfer ‡ow between …rm and worker. In Postel-Vinay and Robin (2003), this division results from the assumption that …rms commit to a …xed wage until a renegotiation occurs. Then, evaluating (39) and (40) at i = j 0 and summing over these equations gives
Thus, the total value of a job in …rm j is characterized by this di¤erential equation that depends on the process for current revenue per worker in …rm j, e y j . Suppose next that …rms are heterogeneous in their (constant) productivity per worker and that they enter sequentially in markets k = 1; ::; K at ages fH k g K k=1 . Letting y k be the revenues per unit of output generated by a …rm who has entered in the …rst k markets, e y j depends on …rm age, a, as given by the step function e y (a; fH k g) = P k 1 (H k a<H k+1 ) y k . Using this in (41), we have a linear di¤erential equation for job value over age ( + ) v (a; fH k g) = e y (a; fH k g) + w u + dv (a; fH k g) :
Expressing the solution to this equation in terms of the time until switch x k 0 for each market k gives
In the case of K = 1 and = 1 this constitutes the expression in (3); for K = 2 this is expression (31) .
Proof of Proposition 1
The …rst order condition in the …rm problem is:
where, replacing the expression in (12) into (10),
We have:
From (i) and the …rst order condition, f X > 0 implies that h > 0. From (ii), there is a unique interior solution to the …rm problem. From (iii), if f X > ( 1) y D ( u u=M ) (1 + e ) = then S (h) < f X for all h, and the …rst order condition implies that h = 1. This proves the …rst part of the proposition. Comparative statics follow from the interior solution S (h) = f X , inspection of the change in S (h) with respect to each parameter and (ii) above.
Using J u (x), J (x 0 ; x) and v (x) from (1) to (3) we can write (h; H) = A (h; H) = [B (h; H) + C (h; H)], where
where, in B (h; H):
The …rst equality above follows from (18), the second from (17) and the third from (16 
Proof of Proposition 2 Let 0 (H) (H; H).
In an interior equilibrium, 0 (H) = f X =f D . We have that 1 (h; H) > 0 for all H by inspection of (h; H), J u (h; H) and J (x; h), and that 2 (H; H) > 0 from Lemma 2. Therefore, 0 0 (H) > 0, implying that an interior equilibrium is unique. For existence of the interior equilibrium, 0 (0) = 0 implies that H > 0. On the other hand, if (24) in the text, then no interior equilibrium exists. In the other direction, if H = 1 is an equilibrium, then it must be that no …rm invests when no …rm invests, i.e.
Proof of Proposition 3
In an interior equilibrium,
Changes in parameters that raise (H; H) given H lead to lower equilibrium H. By inspection, we have @ (H; H) =@ u = 0 and @ (H; H) =@b > 0. Multiplying numerator and denominator of (H; H) by 1 + e e H = ( 1) we see that @ (H; H) =@ > 0 if (23) holds. Finally, the numerator of (H; H) is increasing in e while some manipulation shows that the denominator is decreasing since e H < 1, implying @ (H; H) =@ e > 0. By inspection of (15) to (17) , each of the parameter changes leading to a lower H also lead to an increase in m X , e X and y.
Proof of Proposition 4 I start by proving (25) . Then, I use this condition to show that, if < ,
These four properties imply the proposition.
Start by considering an equilibrium where every …rm switches at age H, and let N (h) be the size of a …rm of age h. The net ‡ow of workers in a …rm of age h is
where P H (h) = 1 e h and G H (h) = P H (h) = f1 + e [1 P H (h)]g are the …rm and employment distributions de…ned over age, instead of over time until investment as in (13) and (14), respectively. Workers in …rms older than H who contact another …rm older than H are indi¤erent about making a transition, in which case they move with exogenous probability $ 2 [0; 1]. The rate at which workers leave the …rm is weakly decreasing and the number of new hires is weakly increasing in h, so N (h) is increasing. Letting F (n) be the share of …rms of size less than n, we have, from the exponential distribution of ages, that F (n) = 1 e N 1 (n) . This implies
implying (25) . If h < H and e = 0 then N 00 (h) =N 0 (h) = , and if h > H then N 00 (h) =N 0 (h) = f + $ e [1 P H (H)]g, implying (i) and (iv) above. If h < H, from (46) ,
At h = 0, (47) yields N 00 (h) =N 0 (h) = e ( + e ) = ( + + e ) < 0, implying (ii). Since the denominator in the right-hand side of (47) is positive we have that, as long as h < H,
A.3 Appendix to Section 4
Derivation of (26) and (27) I derive the linear revenue function used in sections 4 and 6 from a standard monopolistic competition setting extended with a quality choice. Output of the …nal good in each country is
; where I is the set of available varieties from any country, while q i and z i denote the quantity and the quality of each variety. This good is produced in a competitive sector that uses the di¤erentiated varieties as inputs, resulting in a demand for i of
where e p i is the price of variety i and P = R z i e p
is the domestic price index.
Consider …rms in the home market, indexed by 0, in a world with many countries. Given levels of quantity q and quality z, a …rm selling in a set J of markets (including the domestic market) chooses the fraction s j of total output to ship to market j. Of each unit shipped to country j 6 = 0 only a fraction 1= j < 1 arrives. Letting
we have that revenues of an exporter to a set J of markets are e r J (z; q) = max
where the second equality follows from evaluating the revenue function at the optimal shares of output directed to each destination,
In each moment …rms have a stock of n workers evolving over time as described in the text. This workforce can be allocated to produce …nal goods, either for domestic or foreign shipment, or quality. The production frontier within …rms is linear in these variables: a …rm with n workers and productivity faces the constraint
The introduction of here serves only to save notation. Firms maximize e r J (z; q) in (48) subject to this constraint. As a result, the optimal allocation of workers dictates that …rm quantity and quality increase linearly with the stock of workers no matter the export status:
Using (50) in the revenue function (48) and normalizing by the domestic price index, real revenues (i.e., in terms of domestic …nal good) in a …rm with n workers exporting to a set J of markets are linear in n,
Revenues per unit of output are
and the revenue premium of a …rm exporting to a set J of markets is:
Evaluating (49) and (53) in the case of two countries and = 1 gives (26) and (27) in Section 4, while setting the number of markets to be at most 3 gives the revenue premia in (32) to (34) in Section 6.
Proof of Proposition 5 Using (27) for both countries and the …rst equality of (30) in (29) yields
Since de X =d 0 and ds X =d > 0, if e X > 0 and e X > 0 this gives an increasing relation between and . If ( + ) (1 + e ) = [ (1 b)] ! 1 or f X =f D ! 0, we have from Proposition 2 that e X (1) = s X (1) = 0 and that de X =d > 0 if e X < 1. The same applies in the foreign country. Therefore, (54) is satis…ed with both sides equal to zero at = = 1 and each side is strictly increasing in its respective argument if > 1 and > 1. On the other hand, the second equality in (30) gives an hyperbole in the region determined by > 1 and > 1, with the property that ! 1 as ! 1, and vice versa. This implies that only one point in the region determined by > 1 and > 1 satis…es the equilibrium conditions.
Proof of Proposition 6 Under the conditions from Proposition 4, from (54) we can implicitly write as an increasing function of . The equilibrium values for and correspond to the intersection between this function and (30). From Proposition 3, e X ( ) in (54) increases for each value of with a rise in b or in 1 , hence the new equilibrium must have a larger and a lower . The increase in export participation in the home country follows from Proposition 3. For the increase in export participation in the foreign economy, we have that with a rise in b or in 1 , the increase in leads to an increase in the right hand side of (54) . Since decreases in the left hand side, so does s X ( ), meaning that e X ( ) and therefore m X ( ) must increase. On the other hand, consider a reduction in and suppose that shrinks. Then, must increase in (30) , the right hand side of (54) decreases and, from Proposition 3, the left hand side increases, which can't be an equilibrium. Therefore, must increase. The …rm chooses h 1 and h 2 to maximize 0 (h 1 ; h 2 ; ") in (58) . In an interior solution, the …rst order conditions can be written as Taking derivatives of (57) and using the resulting expression for 2 (x 1 ; x 1 + h 2 ; ) in these conditions gives the …rst-order conditions (35) and (36) The left hand side of the second equality is strictly increasing in h 2 and independent from h 1 , while the …rst is strictly increasing in both h 1 and h 2 , implying a unique interior solution to the …rm problem. Since 0 (x; ) and v (x; ) are increasing in , the left-hand side of both functions is increasing in , while the …rm speci…c …xed cost only appears on the right hand side, implying part (i) of the proposition. Part (ii) follows from inspection of (60) and (61). For (iii), note that the …rm entering in both markets and entering …rst in market 1 can only be an outcome if the right-hand side of (61) is positive, i.e. if f 2 =f 1 > ( 12 1 ) = ( 1 1). Thus, if we conjecture that the …rm enters …rst in 2 and then in 1, we have a contradiction if the right-hand side of the version of (61) under this conjecture is negative, i.e. if f 1 =f 2 < ( 12 2 ) = ( 2 1). These inequalities imply (iii).
De…nition of the Equilibrium
To proceed with the de…nition of the equilibrium, let h k (") denote the choice of …rm ". Then, from the …rst order condition of the …rm problem we have, as in (11) , the value of the …rm at entry, now indexed by the …rm type:
e (") (h 1 (") ; h 1 (") + h 2 (") ; ) = ( + ) :
De…ning the equilibrium requires, …rst, that we identify the function P v (v) that indicates the probability 5 0 I use the notation 1 (a; b; ) = @ (x; y; ) =@x and 2 (a; b; ) = @ (x; y; ) =@y evaluated at (x; y) = (a; b).
that a worker who samples a …rm …nds job with value below v; this is equivalent to P (x) in the basic model. To …nd that function de…ne …rst the equilibrium value of a job o¤ered by …rm " over age:
v (a; ") v (max [h 1 (") a; 0] ; max [h 1 (") + h 2 (") a; 0] ; ) :
Notice that v (h; ") is strictly increasing in a; as such having a well de…ned inverse denoted by a (v; ").
Using (56), de…ne also the level of search chosen by …rms of type " and age a as:
s (a; ") s (v (a; ")) :
The e¤ective measure that a …rm of age a and type " has in the labor market is s (a; ") =s. Therefore, the sampling function is:
where E " denotes the expectation over the distribution of …rm types ". This function yields in turn the share of employment in …rms with value of jobs below v:
The measure of …rms in the economy is determined by zero pro…ts. Entry requires ‡ow equivalent …xed costs of f 0 in each period, so that the free entry condition is:
Aggregate income in the economy depends now on both productivity and the distribution of switching ages. Let y (a; ") = 1 (a<h1(")) y 0 + 1 (h1(") a<h1(")+h2(")) y 1 + 1 (h1(")+h2(") a) y 2 be the revenue per worker generated in …rm " when it has age a. Aggregate income is Y 0 = (1 u) y, where output per employed worker equals y = (1 u) E [y (a; ")] ;
where the expectation is taken with respect to the equilibrium distribution of employment over states (a; ") induced by P v (v). As before, the value of unemployment is
Summarizing:
De…nition 3 A general equilibrium consists of individual rules fh k (") ; s (a; ")g, distributions fG v (v) ; P v (y)g, a number of …rms M , output per worker y, consumption c and value of unemployment w u such that: a) the …rst-order conditions from the …rm problem, (35) , (36) and (63), hold; b) there is consistency between the individual decision rules and the aggregate distributions, (64) and (65); c) the number of …rms adjusts to satisfy free entry, (66); d) output per worker is given by (67); e) the value of unemployment is given by (68); and f ) goods market clear.
B Data appendix B.1 Construction of Variables
The dataset used in the construction of the …gures and in the regressions below is a match of two sources. Exports data is standard customs data at the …rm-year level. This is linked with …rm employment data from administrative records. The data is from the Employment and Business Dynamics Observatory of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of Argentina (OEDE). All …rms are required to report their formal employees on a monthly basis. Workers who are not reported are either informally employed or unemployed. In each of six two-month periods within each year between 1998 and 2008, every formal worker of age 18 to 64 is linked to the …rm where he/she is reported as earning the highest wage. Workers earning below the minimum wage are excluded. Thus, the data includes the universe of …rms that report employment above the minimum wage in any period in these years.
Each …rm-year observation is marked as an exporter if the …rm exports at least USD 10000. The age of the …rm is the di¤erence between the current year and the year of birth of the …rm for tax purposes. The number of workers per …rm-year is computed as the average employment over periods within year in which the …rm reports positive employment. Industries are de…ned at the two-digit level. A worker employed in a …rm is considered as a new hire if he/she is not employed in the …rm in the previous period. To compute the fraction of new hires coming from other formal jobs in any sector of the economy for each …rm-year, the shares are …rst computed for each pair of consecutive periods within year, and then averaged across periods within year for each …rm. Similar steps are followed to compute the fraction of new hires from the manufacturing sector entering …rms from jobs in exporting …rms.
All …gures are based on …rms from the manufacturing sector. Exiting …rms of any export status (i.e., …rms present in a given year who do not report employment in the next) are excluded. Firms who do not report formal employment but who report exports are excluded, as well as industries with less than onehundred …rms in any year. The resulting sample represents on average 97% of the formal employment and 82% of all …rms who either export or formally report the wages of their employees in the manufacturing sector between 1999 and 2007, with a total of 429934 …rm-year observations. Table B .1 shows that the rankings in the share of new hires from other jobs and from exporting …rms in …gures 6 and 7 are statistically signi…cant including various controls. For the regressions the sample is restricted to the period 2003-2007, but same coe¢ cients are signi…cant for 1999-2002. Column 1 in each set of regressions includes only industry-year …xed e¤ects. The di¤erence in the share of new hires from other jobs between non-exporters and exporters to no more than 5 countries is of 9 percent points, and between non-exporters and exporters to more than 5 countries is of 21 percent points. Columns 2 to 4 control for a second order polynomial in size and in age, wage, or net job creation. As we should expect from the theory, controlling for age and size shrinks the magnitude of the coe¢ cients on the indicator for export status. To the extent that the current wage is a re ‡ection of the higher average value of jobs o¤ered by exporting …rms, it should have a similar qualitative e¤ect than …rm size, as we observe in the regression. The number of hires and separations controls for the possibility that expanding and contracting …rms exhibit di¤erent patterns in the composition of new hires. When all the controls are included, in Column 5, the di¤erences in the composition of new hires by export status are still signi…cant. Values marked with a star are signi…cant at 1% and standard errors clustered by …rm are reported below each coe¢ cient. The explained variables are in percent terms, the …rst two rows correspond to an indicator of the export status of the …rm, and the remaining explanatory variables are in logs. The number of observations in the …rst set of regressions corresponds to the number of …rm-year observations with positive number of new hires, and the number of observations in the second set is the number with positive number of new hires from the manufacturing sector.
B.2 Regressions

